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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals in Section 
78-2a-3 of the Utah Code. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of criminal 
conviction on June 9, 1988, imposed by the Third Circuit Court, 
Sandy Department, Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the Defendant in actual physical control of a vehicle or 
did the Defendant operate a vehicle for purposes of Section 119 
of the Sandy City Traffic Code when police found the Defendant 
seated in the driver's seat of a car stopped on an incline at ^  
the side of the road turning a key in the ignition in an 
attempt to start the car? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-1-501 (1) (1953, as amended): 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted. 
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, Section 119 (1): 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be 
in actual physical control of a vehicle within 
this city if the person has a blood or breath 
alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight as 
shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
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degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is limited to those facts relevant to 
the issue of operation or actual physical control. 
On November 2, 1985 at about 11:50 p.m., Officer Cravens of 
the Sandy Police Department saw a vehicle stopped on the side 
of 8600 South in Sandy City. Trans. 3-4. The road runs east 
and west, inclining to the east in the area where the car was 
stopped. Trans. 5. The officer found the car at about 1815-~ 
East. Between 7th East and 20th East, the road inclines at 
different levels. Trans. 41. 
The car was facing east on the shoulder of the road. Trans. 
5. The officer could not recall whether any portion of the car 
was on the pavement of the road but did say that it was on the 
"pull-off section." Trans. 6. There was a partially 
constructed church on the side of the road where the car was 
stopped. A park was on the other side. Trans. 5. 
When the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed that 
someone was seated directly behind the steering wheel of the 
vehicle and could hear the grinding of the car's starting 
motor. Trans. 7. When the officer reached the vehicle, he 
found the defendant, the only occupant, to be the person behind 
the steering wheel. He also noticed that there were keys in 
the ignition. Trans. 7. The Defendant later claimed in court 
that by attempting to start the car he was merely trying to 
show the officer that the car was having troubles. Trans. 46. 
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But he also admitted that while sitting in the car before the 
officer arrived he would "every now and again . . . just sit 
there and twist the key." Trans. 43. 
Both the Defendant and his brother, Michael, stated at trial 
that Michael had driven the car to the point where it had 
stopped. Trans. 36 and 43. Not being able to start the 
vehicle, Michael said he left to find a telephone. Trans. 36. 
However, to the best of the officer's recollection, he did not 
remember the Defendant's saying that someone else had driven 
the car. Trans. 29. And Michael admitted not telling the 
officer upon first meeting him that he had been driving the 
car. He explained that he was as "drunk" as the Defendant anc| 
said that he did not want to incriminate himself. Trans. 37. 
Rather, Michael said he first told the officer that his brother 
had not driven the car and only afterwards stated that he 
specifically had driven the car. Trans. 37-38. The officer 
did not recall whether Michael made any such statements. Trans 
30-31. 
After approaching the car and hearing the car's engine being 
turned over, the officer asked the Defendant why he was there 
and the Defendant indicated that "he was having car troubles." 
Trans. 9. Specifically, the Defendant said that his car was 
flooded and stated further to the officer, "Smell the Carb." 
Trans. 10. The Defendant's brother also stated at trial that 
when the car stopped he believed that the engine might have 
been flooded. Trans. 36. Officer Cravens testified that a car 
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which is flooded is not disabled permanently and can be 
restarted. Trans. 10-11. 
After the Defendant's arrest, the car was towed to an 
impound lot. Michael picked the car up at the lot. He had to 
jump the car to another vehicle before the starting motor would 
operate. After connecting the jumper cables, he tried starting 
the car without success. He then put gas in the car and it 
started. However, Michael said that even before he put gas in 
the car the gas gauge showed that the tank was not completely 
empty and that this was exactly how the gauge had read the 
night before. Trans. 38-39. Furthermore, Michael, who said he 
had experience in auto mechanics, admitted that there may have 
been gas in the fuel tank but that it would not flow into the 
fuel line connected to the fuel tank because of the incline on 
8600 South. He admitted further that a change in the incline 
could have caused fuel to flow into the fuel line. Trans. 41. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For a conviction under Section 119 of the Sandy City Traffic 
Code, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
Actual physical control means "present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination or regulation." This standard 
can be met by actions which fall short of actual operation of a 
vehicle. The standards for "operation" and "actual physical 
control" are, therefore, separate and distinct. 
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That the Defendant was in actual physical control is proven 
by the fact that he was found behind the steering wheel of the 
vehicle, not only had possession of the keys but had them in 
the car's ignition, and was attempting to start the car. 
The Defendant argues that he was not in actual physical 
control because, he claims, the car was either flooded or out 
of gas. The question, then, is whether a vehicle's ability to 
operate should be considered part of the standard for 
determining actual physical control. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that it should not. 
This conclusion is based on the policy that 1) people who are 
intoxicated should not be permitted to enter a vehicle except 
as passengers or passive occupants, and 2) that intoxicated 
drivers should be apprehended before they strike, such that the 
actual physical control requirement should not be read "to 
exclude those whose vehicles are presently immobile because of 
mechanical trouble." 
But even if vehicle operability is considered part of the 
standard for determining actual physical control, there was 
still sufficient evidence to show actual physical control. The 
evidence does not show conclusively that the car was in fact 
out of gas. To the contrary, there was evidence that the car 
either flooded or only low on gas. Furthermore, because the 
vehicle was stopped on a hill, it was probably capable of 
motion even if the engine would not run. 
There was also sufficient evidence to show that the 
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Defendant had operated the vehicle. It was clear that someone 
had driven the vehicle to the point it was stopped. The 
Defendant was behind the steering wheel. He had the keys. He 
was trying to start the car. In addition, the officer did not 
recall either the Defendant or his brother stating at the time 
of the investigation that the Defendant's brother had been 
driving. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE IN 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 119. 
A. For Purposes of Section 119 of the Sandy Traffic Code, 
The Issues of "Operation" and "Actual Physical Control" are 
Proven by Separate Standards. 
In any DUI case in the state of Utah, the prosecution must 
prove that a defendant was either operating a vehicle or in 
actual physical control. U.C.A. 41-6-44(1)(a); Section 119 
(l)(a), Traffic Code of Sandy City. Before proceeding to a 
discussion of the facts in this case, if is important to 
establish the difference between the issues of "operation" and 
"actual physical control." 
The issues of operation and actual physical control are 
separate, although in most case both can be shown. For 
example, the typical DUI defendant is stopped after a police 
officer witnesses the defendant driving a vehicle in an erratic 
or improper manner. The defendant is "operating" the vehicle 
by the common understanding of the word. The defendant is also 
in "actual physical control" as the term was defined in State 
v. Bugger: "present bodily restraint, directing influence, 
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domination or regulation," 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971). 
The issues become more distinct in other cases. A person 
found beside a vehicle unconscious because of injury or 
intoxication, for example, is not in actual physical control 
because there is no present bodily restraint or direction of 
influence, domination, or regulation. But the prosecution may 
still be able to show through circumstantial evidence that the 
defendant had operated the vehicle. 
There are, however, cases much the opposite. There may be 
little or no evidence that the defendant operated the vehicle 
or that the vehicle was operated at all. But the defendant 
might be found exerting control over the vehicle by such
 t 
actions as sitting behind the steering wheel and having the key 
in the ignition—whether or not the vehicle is running. "These 
are cases, similar to the case at hand, in which actual 
physical control comes directly into issue. 
B. Whether the Vehicle in Which the Defendant was 
Positioned was Operable Should Not be Considered in Resolving 
the Issue of Actual Physical Control. 
The argument that the Defendant was in actual physical 
control is based on the legal definition of actual physical 
control and the policy behind DUI law. 
The question of whether the Defendant was in actual physical 
control rests on whether, as stated above, he was exerting 
present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or 
regulation over the vehicle. State v. Bugger; Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1982); State v. Smelter, 
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674 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. App. 1984). There were facts 
sufficient for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that such control existed. An appellate court should 
offer great deference such a finding "unless the trial court 
has misapplied the law or its findings are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence." Garcia, at 653. 
Officer Cravens found the Defendant fully conscious, 
directly behind the steering wheel of the car. The Defendant 
not only had possession of the keys to the vehicle, but had the 
keys in the ignition and was attempting to start the car. 
These facts are uncontroverted. If the car had started, there 
would have been no question that the Defendant was in actual 
physical control. 
Many courts have held that acts short of starting a car are 
sufficient to constitute actual physical control: Hughes v. 
State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), Defendant was 
improperly parked in residential area while seated in front 
seat with key in the ignition and engine off; City of 
Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio 1976), Defendant was 
legally parked while seated in driver's seat with hands on 
steering wheel and keys in the ignition and engine off; State 
v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1976), Defendant was in the 
driver's seat of a car in a ditch, keys in ignition. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court was justified by the 
evidence. 
The issue on appeal, however, is one of interpretation of 
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law: Was the Defendant was in actual physical control when the 
Defendant has claimed that the vehicle vehicle was inoperable 
because it was either flooded or out of gas? The prosecution 
contests that the vehicle was inoperable, and that argument 
will be addressed later. 
The immediate question is whether vehicle operability should 
be considered part of the standard for actual physical control. 
One court has made the operability of the vehicle part of the 
elements of actual physical control: Along with active or 
constructive possession of the keys and position of the 
Defendant in the driver's seat, the vehicle must be "operable 
to some extent." Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d 701, 703-4< 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1982); quoted in Smelter, at 692. 
No such guidelines concerning the operation of the vehicle 
have been established in Utah. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court 
has excluded the operability of the vehicle from the standard 
for actual physical control. In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a district 
court's affirmation of a decision by the Utah State Driver 
License Division to revoke the Defendant's driver's license 
under Section 41-6-44.10 of the Utah Code. This statute 
requires a finding of operation or actual physical control of a 
vehicle before a person's driver's license may be revoked for 
failure to submit to a breath test. 
In Lopez, police officers found the defendant in the 
driver's seat of a pickup truck with his head resting on the 
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steering wheel. The engine was not running, but the keys were 
in the ignition and when the officer removed them he had to 
turn them to get them out. JEd. at 779. The Defendant stated 
at trial, for the first time, that his wife had actually been 
driving when the battery died. He stated that he was waiting 
for her to return with a car with which they could tow the 
truck. Id. at 780. 
In finding that the Defendant was in actual physical 
control, the Court decided as a matter of policy that vehicle 
operability is unnecessary to proof of actual physical control. 
Speaking of actual physical control, the Court said: "That 
requirement was intended by our legislature to protect public 
safety and apprehend the drunken driver before he or she 
strikes, . . . and may not be construed to exclude those"whose 
vehicle are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble. 
Id. at 781 (Citations excluded). 
In addition to this conclusion, the Lopez Court appears to 
have takem one further step in its analysis of actual physical 
control. In analyzing the issue of actual physical control, 
the Court focused heavily on the position the Defendant in the 
driver's seat. It distinguished the case from State v. Bugger 
in which actual physical control was not found when the 
Defendant was found sleeping in a vehicle parked completely off 
the road with the engine off and when there was no evidence 
that he Defendant was behind the driver's seat. Id. at 780. 
After the Court concluded its analysis of actual physical 
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control, it noted some facts which normally would go to the 
issue of operation rather than actual physical control. The 
Court stated that the trial court "found that there were tire 
tracks leading up to the vehicle" and "that the vehicle had to 
have reached its point of rest apparently on its own power.'" 
Id. at 781. By including these additional facts, the Court may 
have suggested that facts which go to operation may be used to 
reinforce the finding of actual physical control. 
Based on Lopez, the Defendant in the case at hand should be 
found in actual physical control despite any claim that the 
vehicle was inoperable. Lopez, in effect, established a bright 
line rule for cases in which the claim is made that the vehicle 
was inoperable. This is not a new rule in Utah. Lopez was 
based on Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). 
In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court again addressed the 
question of actual physical control in relation to Section 41-
6-44.10. In this case, the defendant's vehicle was operable, 
but the vehicle could not have moved far because it was boxed 
in by a fence several feet in front and a car several feet 
behind. The defendant was found behind the steering wheel 
attempting to start the car. 
The Court stated specifically that the standard for 
determining whether someone was "driving" or "operating" a 
vehicle was different from the standard for determining whether 
someone was "in actual physical control." _Id. at 653. The 
Court noted that in 1969 the legislature added the actual 
12 
physical control language to the preexisting "driving" 
language, suggesting the legislature specifically expanded the 
scope of 41-6-44.10. Ld. at 653, n.l. 
In holding that the defendant was in actual physical 
control, the Court concluded that the actual physical control 
language of 41-6-44.10 "should be read as intending to prevent 
intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as 
passengers or passive occupants." Jd. at 654. It can be 
assumed that the same raltionale applies to Section 41-6-44, 
the statute on which Sandy City's DUI ordinance is based, 
because it has a similar history to Section 41-6-44.10. 
A bright line rule which excludes vehicle operability as 
part of the standard for finding actual physical control is 
logical in view of the confusion that would otherwise result. 
Many DUI cases would have a built-in defense to actual physical 
control. In cases similar to the one at hand, defendants could 
come to court claiming that the vehicle was inoperable because 
of any number of mechanical problems. These claims would be 
difficult to rebut unless in each of these case the arresting 
officer takes the awkward and burdensome step of testing the 
car for operability. 
Of course, there are logical limitations to a bright line 
rule. If a vehicle is visibly inoperable, as where, for 
example, it does not have an engine or tires, an occupant would 
generally not be in actual physical control. But when the 
vehicle is operable by all outward appearances, an occupant is 
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in actual physical control when there are facts to support 
existing or present bodily restraint, or direction of 
influence, domination, or regulation. 
Following the reasoning above, there was evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in actual 
physical control of a vehicle. It might be argued that Lopez 
and Garcia are distinguishable from this case because they were 
decided under a preponderance of evidence standard. But there 
are so few facts that go into determining actual physical 
control that the issue is essentially a yes or no question. 
The factors to be considered are whether the defendant had 
possession of the keys and whether the defendant was seated inf. 
the driver's seat. Little more can be shown short of actual 
operation. The Defendant in this case was in the driver's 
seat, and he not only had possession of the keys but had them 
in the ignition and was attempting to start the engine. 
C. The Defendant was in Actual Physical Control even if the 
Operability of the Vehicle is Considered. 
Even if the operability of the vehicle is considered a 
component of actual physical control, there are facts in the 
record that support a conclusion that the vehicle was operable. 
First, the record does not show conclusively that the car 
was out of gas. To the contrary, there was evidence that the 
car's gas gauge did not indicate the vehicle was empty. 
Furthermore, the Defendant told the officer that the vehicle 
was flooded, suggesting that there was gas. It is common 
knowledge among drivers that a flooded car can start at any 
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time, and Officer Cravens testified to this effect. 
It is also common knowledge that even if a car stalls for 
lack of gas, there is often enough gas left over for the car to 
start for a brief period. It would take little movement of a 
vehicle by an intoxicated driver to cause an accident. This 
appears to have been the conclusion of the Court in Garcia in 
which the vehicle could only have been moved several feet. 
The fact that the vehicle started after the Defendant's put 
gas in it is not conclusive that the vehicle was out of gas. 
The record shows only that the Defendant's brother went to the 
impound lot and attempted without success to start the vehicle. 
He then put gas in the vehicle and it started. The record does 
not show,, however, how many times Michael attempted to start 
the car. It is possible that had he attempted further the car 
may have started. The brother admitted that the car might have 
just been low on gas and that the incline on 8600 South tipped 
the gas tank in such a position that gas was not getting into 
the fuel line. The change in incline between 8600 South and 
the impound lot may have been enough to cause fuel to flow into 
the line and start the engine had he attempted further to start 
the car. 
Second, the record is not conclusive that even if the 
vehicle was out of gas it could not have either moved by its 
own momentum or been moved to a place where it could have been 
started. The record is replete with indications that the 
vehicle was traveling up an incline when it stopped. If the 
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vehicle was parked on an incline, it is possible that had the 
Defendant, intentionally or not, taken off the brake and taken 
the vehicle out of gear it would have rolled down hill, 
presenting the same sort of danger to the public that the DUI 
laws are drafted to prevent. 
Furthermore, the vehicle might have been pushed or rolled to 
a level where it would be able to start. Again, the 
Defendant's brother testified that at a different incline, fuel 
might have been able to flow into the fuel line. And the 
Defendant's brother testified that 8600 South varies in level 
of incline. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD< 
OPERATED A VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 119. 
One more point needs to be discussed. So far the focus has 
been on actual physical control. But there was sufficient 
evidence to show that the Defendant "operated" the vehicle to 
the point at which the police officer found it stopped. 
First, there was evidence that someone had been operating 
the vehicle to the point where the officer found it. Officer 
Cravens observed the vehicle in an area where cars would not 
normally be parked: a park was on one side of the road, and it 
was, presumably, closed at the time; a partially constructed 
church was on the side of the road where the car was stopped. 
Officer Cravens could see a person in the car as he approached. 
Second, there was sufficient evidence to show that the 
defendant was the person who had operated the vehicle. The 
Defendant was found in the driver's seat. He had possession of 
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the key. He was found trying to start the car. When Officer 
Cravens asked the Defendant why he was there, the Defendant 
said that he was having car troubles. 
The Defendant said that the reason he was trying to start 
the car when the officer pulled up was to demonstrate that the 
car would not start. This explanation is particularly unlikely 
in view of the fact that 1) someone had run down the battery, 
most likely attempting to start the car, 2) no evidence was 
offered that the battery was low when the brother left the 
vehicle to find a phone, and 3) the Defendant stated that while 
waiting in the car he would turn the key every so often. 
One further piece of evidence is persuasive that the 
Defendant had operated the vehicle. Officer Cravens did not 
recall that either the Defendant or his brother stated at the 
time of the investigation that Michael had actually been 
driving. Certainly, a police officer would have noted such a 
statement in his report and been prepared to address the issue 
at trial. 
It appears, then, that the issue was raised for the first 
time at trial. Such was the case in Lopez and the Court very 
clearly stated its disapproval. Id. at 780. The Defendant and 
his brother testified that they did tell the officer that the 
brother was driving. But these testimonies are hedged in 
doubt. The brother said that he didn't tell the officer at 
first because he was intoxicated himself and did not want to 
incriminate himself. This explanation may hold some 
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credibility because it is against the brother's interest, but 
it is also a little too convenient. 
Finally, even if the evidence is insufficient to show 
operation, under Lopez evidence of operation may be used to 
reinforce a finding of actual physical control. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard for determining whether a driver is in actual 
physical control of a vehicle for purposes of the this state's 
DUI laws should be consistent with the policy of not allowing 
intoxicated people in a vehicle except as passengers or passive 
occupants. That standard should, therefore, not include the 
issue of whether the vehicle was operable. The Defendant was 
therefore in actual physical control of the vehicle because he 
was in the driver's seat, had possession of the keys, and was 
attempting to start the vehicle. Based on this and the other 
forgoing arguments, the Respondent respectfully requests that 
the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
DATED January 30, 1989. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
C^J^/ t4/. ^^C 
Clifford W. Lark 
Sandy City Prosecutor 
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